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I. Background
The prolonged, two-year reconciliation conference held in Kenya and 
the resulting interim administration, implemented under the dominant 
tutelage of Ethiopia, are generally considered to have failed to live up 
to the expectations of the Somali people. The state structure was built 
on the foundation of a clan power segregation system known as 4.5 
(four-point-five). This means the separation of the Somali people into 
four clans that are equal and, as such, pure Somali, against an amalga-
mation of various clans and communities that are unequal to the first 
group and, hence, considered “impure” or less Somali. The lumping 
together of all the latter communities is regarded as equivalent only to 
a half of the share of a clan.
In spite of the inherent segregation and marginalization, some schol-
ars of Somali society, like historian Mohamed H. Mukhtar, believe that 
the apartheid-like 4.5 system is an “important accomplishment.”1 In a 
book chapter titled “Somali Reconciliation Conferences: The Unbeaten 
Track,” Mukhtar chronicles this episode as one of various “success sto-
ries”2 that have emerged from the Sodere factional meeting of 1997. As 
the historian posits it, this could be called an achievement, particularly 
considering the fact that “for the first time Somali clans agreed about 
their relative size, power and territorial rights.”3 Then the professor 
emphasizes that, “the conference also recognized another segment of 
the Somali society which included minority groups not identified with 
one of the above clans, i.e., the Banadiris and the Somali Bantus, just to 
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mention some.”4 In what is a concluding thought, he sounds more firm 
in his suggestion and writes, “After Sodere, the question of clan com-
position of any future Somali ‘conference’ should not be a problem.”5
Despite our high esteem for Mukhtar, we must elucidate a different 
version of the 4.5 factor, which, unlike his opinion, brings to the sur-
face sharp disagreement and displeasure from certain communities. 
To do so, we will quote contrasting views by other scholars as well as 
notable Somalis from various kin-affiliations who have criticized and 
denounced the 4.5 method as a divisive technique; one which is per-
ceived to be unharmonious to the tenets of equality and mutual coexis-
tence among the diverse communities in the country. In addition, one 
of the authors (Mohamed Eno) was an official participant in the confer-
ence while Omar Eno (the co-author) paid several visits, studying the 
nature of the conference and particularly interviewing participants 
on their view regarding the 4.5 system. To this effect, the writers also 
conducted two workshops at Sports View Hotel in Kasarani, on the 
outskirts of Nairobi, on separate occasions, and made a video film of 
the discussions that ensued.
II. Contentions about the 4.5 Formula
Mukhtar’s discourse should be analyzed from varying perspectives 
in order to get at the value of the essay, examining points that might 
contradict what he actually intended. From the outset, the 4.5 system 
represents absolute discrimination and severe ethnic marginalization. 
Upon its introduction as an instrument for power sharing, the affected 
communities protested against it forthwith as well as in many other 
forums, and indeed continue to do so to this day.
Apart from the Bantu Jareer voices of protest, non-Jareer and con-
cerned Somali groups of various kin-identities and social backgrounds 
have proactively analyzed the magnitude of the bigotry underpinning 
the 4.5 clan system. We introduce these views with the account given 
by Fatun Mohamed Hassan and Abdalla Hirad who, as early as Octo-
ber 2002, expressed how visionary sections of the society “have dis-
agreed with the so-called ‘4.5-formula,’ which they feel leaves out the 
‘Jareer Weyn’ as a major clan in Somalia.”6 In their argument, Hassan 
and Hirad contend:
It is our strong belief that ‘clanism’—which is the value that the so-called 
‘4.5-formula’ could only, and would definitely, encourage—is almost 
139
always counterproductive…the ‘4.5-formula’ should never be used to 
account for the principle of ‘equitability,’ which is—must be—the basis 
for the distribution of political power, economic benefits and develop-
ment resources in the future of Somalia.7
In their view, Hassan and Hirad sum up the 4.5 principle as one that, 
“is not definitely a smart approach to running the affairs of a state.”8
Another Somali commentator, Mohamed Abdullahi, argues, “The 
4.5-clan formula has no base in Somali reality.”9 Abdullahi does not see 
the clanist arrangement as a solution to the Somali impasse. Although 
Mukhtar acknowledges the 4.5 system as a unique accomplishment 
(convenient for running state affairs), analysts like John Prendergast 
suggest that, despite the wide representation of the major clans in the 
new Parliament, “the transitional government in its current form con-
centrates power and positions in the hands of some constituencies and 
clans while marginalizing or excluding others.”10
The Gabooye/Baidari community protested with a strong and loud 
voice against this Apartheid-like formula. In a long statement of con-
demnation (copied to the United Nations, several European embassies, 
the United States, and a number of international organizations), the 
Supreme Council of the community denounced the social segrega-
tion blueprint as a “neo-colonialist tool…an oppressive formula.”11 
The community dismisses it because it “will only entrench evil; and 
to show support for this formula is to express support for the continu-
ance of oppression.”12
As one of the contributors to the 4.5 forum, Mahad Sheikh laments, 
“The parliament is based on the [abhorred] clan formula 4.5. Ministers 
are elected on clan allegiance.”13 In his view, the “despised 4.5 tribal 
power sharing is a system that is designed [by] and [for] a few among 
the society that are unqualified to govern.”14 Sheikh does not hesitate 
to categorize it as “a mockery to the democratic nation-state”15 and 
even “genocidal.”16
Other Somalis have similarly deplored the decisions encouraging 
the discriminative policy, including author Omar Eno who, on various 
occasions and with other protestors on Voice of America, denounced 
it as “nothing but discrimination.”17 In the same panel discussion with 
Omar, Abdiaziz Mukhtar (Qariidi), an able analyst of Somali politics in 
the Barre and post-Barre periods, proposed that 4.5 was conceived by 
Hawiye/Darod elders and an exercise “based on discrimination.”18
Mohamed A. Eno and Omar A. Eno
Bildhaan  Vol. 9
140
III. Contrasting Scholars’ Analysis of the 4.5 Formula: 
Abdi Samatar vs. Mohamed Mukhtar
Contrary to Mukhtar’s notion of the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula 
and clan federalism as an accomplishment, leading Somali scholar 
and professor of Geography and Global Studies, Abdi Ismail Samatar, 
defines the recipe as “compartmentalized political order.”19 Detailing 
the intrinsic bias and adverse consequences grounded in this approach, 
Samatar views the 4.5 formula not as a solution, but instead as a bal-
kanizing strategy “driven by rent-seeking (corruption) rather than pro-
viding an efficient service to the citizens.”20
Mukhtar does not reveal whether what he wrote represents his own 
personal view or whether it is a reflection of the sentiments of his 
kin-group or any of his informants. His article is short on providing 
sources to that effect. It is obvious, nonetheless, that Mukhtar’s and 
Samatar’s arguments are based on two divergent “realities” that repre-
sent the attitudes of the Somali people towards the 4.5 power-sharing 
formula.
The contention, it seems to us, is bi-focal and needs to be looked 
at from the angle of: (a) a section of the population that seems to find 
legitimacy in this concept, and (b) an opposing segment of the same 
society that finds fault in the nature of the concept itself. Here lies the 
central difference between Mukhtar and Samatar.
Although we belong to the view characterizing the 4.5 phenom-
enon as a misleading and pernicious concept that could only yield 
marginalization of important communities, Samatar’s argument draws 
much-needed attention to the dispensation itself and the consequences 
for leadership and governance. On the other hand, Mukhtar’s posi-
tion suggests that the 4.5 clan classification is necessary. This might 
be partly explained by the nature of what Mukhtar’s community has 
been through: as a community counted earlier among those slighted 
by the other three groups with whom it has now been made equal. The 
point had previously compelled Mukhtar to describe his Digil-Miri-
fle community as “Silent Sufferers.” Because the Reewing have now 
been “promoted” to equal status with their former marginalizers, the 
learned historian seems to have quickly forgotten the pain of discrimi-
nation and, thus, finds comfort now in the 4.5 system. Furthermore, by 
celebrating this arrangement as a sound measure for distribution of the 
portfolios of the state, Mukhtar seems to have chosen to disdain the 
plight of those who continue to suffer, not only under the three groups, 
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but what has now become four due to the inclusion of Mukhtar’s Ree-
wing kin-group.
Our argument is that it is better to propose a concept that does 
not rob any group of its honor. What the 4.5 system offers is a mere 
continuation of the injustice to the other section of what used to be a 
constituent part of Mukhtar’s “Silent Sufferers.” To put it another way, 
that which is not based on justice will always be a breeding ground 
for future trouble. In comparison, Professor Samatar condemns the 4.5 
formula as a strategy that, “has no chance of leading to political stabil-
ity and economic development.”21 He went so far as to criticize it in a 
Somali seminar in Lenana House in Nairobi, describing its dehumaniz-
ing divisiveness and tendency towards “clanocracy” rather than meri-
tocracy. For Samatar, “The charter grounds public affairs on genealogy 
rather than common citizenship.”22
Samatar’s argument rests on direct observations from the field.23 He 
was present during the crucial debates and discussions when the mar-
ginalized communities were pushing their case against the discrimi-
nation embedded in the 4.5 formula and contesting the myth of the 
existence of four major clans. In contrast, Mukhtar’s reasoning is based 
on the assertion that “the Sodere participants agreed that there are 
four major equal clans.”24 Because it was agreed in Sodere by certain 
participants, Mukhtar wants us to believe that the 4.5 formula cannot 
be challenged. This somewhat ill informed rationale makes axiomatic 
a decision concocted by tribalists, some of them even participants in 
gruesome violations of human rights.
Whereas Mukhtar presents a summation of the 4.5 system as an 
indisputable formula agreed upon by credible delegates, Samatar’s per-
spective is enriched by the insights gained from his intimate encoun-
ters with the social emotions of the participants at the conference, and 
particularly members of communities that feel undervalued. Hence, 
his study “derives particularly from symbolic interactionism,”25 by 
providing “experiences in real situations.”26 The nature of his analysis 
concurs with social science methodologists like Wellington, that quali-
tative data is best “collected in a real-life, nature setting.”27
Despite our respect for Professor Mukhtar as a learned compatriot, 
we must assert the fact that his thinking deliberately discounts the 
rightful claims of equality of those he refers to as “another segment 
of the Somali society which included minority groups.” After report-
ing what the “four major clans” have “agreed to” in Sodere, Ethiopia, 
and Arta, Djibouti, he does not provide a balanced study that portrays 
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the contrasting views related to the 4.5 issue. As a substitute, Mukhtar 
chooses to contaminate scholarship with ethnocentrism, implying that 
as long as the Digil-Mirifle (Sab) kin confederacy is elevated to equal 
status with their former marginalizers, the Samale, the Sodere con-
ception of the 4.5 formula is a worthy accomplishment and should, 
therefore, be accepted as it is. Upon introduction of the 4.5 system, the 
Dir group, which represented many northern Somalis, immediately 
pulled out of the conference and adamantly rejected the 4.5 formula. 
Unlike the Dir, though, the southern Digil/Mirifle clan, which was 
supposed to be “paesano” with the so-called “minorities,” enthusiasti-
cally embraced the apartheid system. This perception leaves us with 
the belief that the Digil/Mirifle conveniently forgot about the similar 
status that they suffered from over the years preceding their elevation 
to equal status with the other three.
Telling experiences (which Mukhtar avoids acknowledging), 
occurred on two different occasions at the annual African Studies 
Association meetings in 2002 and 2004. One of the two authors brought 
forth the unfairness of the 4.5 policy.28 He underscored the consequent 
abuses—psychological, political, economic, and ethnic—inherent in it. 
As a scholar, Professor Mukhtar should have been aware of the intense 
heat emerging from the 4.5 debate since he, too, presented both times 
in the same panel. With that reality in mind, therefore, for the his-
tory professor to suggest a nation-wide endorsement of the 4.5 system 
sounds insincere, if not ethnocentric.
The issue has now become the object of emerging strong voices of 
protest—voices that directly challenge Mukhtar’s bold statement that, 
“clan composition of any future Somali ‘conference’ should not be a 
problem.”29
By extending the topic of clan composition a bit further, and even 
closer to the Mrifle-Sab constituency where the Jareer presence is heavy 
but unacknowledged,30 neither Mukhtar nor any other individual can 
factually and statistically determine “the numerical portrayal”31 of 
even the “sub subgroup” in which they hold ascribed membership. 
Here, a consideration of “rival explanations” would have been profit-
able.32 Scholars of the qualitative method of research advise practi-
tioners “to look for rival or competing themes and explanations both 
inductively and logically.”33 Therefore, by simply replicating what has 
been known over the years about the Somali clans’ self-made concept 
of the four major clans, Mukhtar overlooks the wisdom bequeathed to 
us by qualitative analysis.
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IV. The Reality on the Ground
Elsewhere in the same article, Mukhtar notes that the Reewing Resis-
tance Alliance’s liberation of Bay and Bakool “opened up a Pandora’s 
Box” which, in our view, may bear multiple implications. Regardless, a 
more complex Pandora’s Box might be opened sooner or later when:
a)  The Jareer, masked and oppressed under the treachery of the Digil-
Mirifle confederation, finally determine to stand independently and 
as an entity with a separate identity; or
b)  Accurate counting reveals the true number and significance of 
the Jareer people currently under the domination of the Mirifle-
Reewing.
Professor Mukhtar’s statement about the RRA’s promise regarding 
the liberation of “the last piece of the Digil and Mirifle land”34 is an 
over-glorification. It is a declaration with a political motivation. For 
many, at the time it was made, the real objective was to lure Jareer sup-
port for the RRA mobilization.35 After the liberation of the immediate 
territory of the Mirifle-Sab (Bay and Bakool) was achieved, the full 
truth was exposed.
What sounds cynical about the essay is how it at once bemoans the 
aggression of “foreign” clans with whom, according to Mukhtar, the 
local Digil-Mirifle people shared neither “historical common experi-
ence”36 nor “social contracts,”37 and evades the plight of the Jareer. 
In this context, if the “armed militiamen whose interest and actions 
placed them outside the pale of the Somali customary law,”38 have 
sinned against Mukhtar’s kin-group, one wonders how he would expli-
cate the silent occupation and marginalization of the Jareer among the 
Mirifle-Reewing, or whether the alienation and derogatory epithets, 
such as “boong,” “meddy,” and “Ooji,”39 used against the Jareer have 
any justification in the customary law of the Mirifle-Sab or the Jileec 
Digil-Mirifle portion of that community. In other words, is custom-
ary law protecting the rights of the Jareer aborigines, who admittedly 
share a common historical experience and (selected) social contracts 
with their Reewing counterparts, the Jileec? Social reality shows that 
the Jareer are not accorded their rightful recognition. In fact, they are 
treated as “outside the pale” of Mirifle-Reewing customary law. Daily 
practice clearly shows that within the Reewing cluster of cultures, the 
Jareer aborigines are considered lesser citizens than even the Leysaan, 
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the most recent to be incorporated into the social fabric of the Digi-
Mirifle.
A more recent and vivid prejudice etched into the customary law is 
reflected in the allocation of the parliamentary representatives of the 
Digi-Mirifle major clan. Of more than sixty representatives, the Jareer 
were allocated less than four percent.40 Yet a numerical estimate of 
the Jareer population suggests it is on par with the Jileec Mirifle-Ree-
win. Those of the Digil-Mirifle Boong-Bilis self-same school of thought 
avoid the question of whether the allocation of parliamentary seats 
and representation of this nature are grounded in another 4.5 system 
within the context of the Digil-Mirifle Boong-Bilis divide. Or is there 
any other statistical or categorical basis, such as the “ethnic purity” of 
the Mirifle-Reewin? Or does customary law of this nature embrace the 
sharing of “historical common experiences and social contracts,” as 
Mukhtar wants us to believe?
It is our conclusion that ideologies of segregation and exploitation, 
coupled with the ill intentions of the 4.5 clan categorization method, 
are misconceptions detrimental to any creation of a justice-based 
Somali society. More immediately, the Somali attitude of “use, exploit, 
and dump” is long overdue for critical examination in Somali Studies.
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